Gender differences in the giving and taking variants of the Dictator game. by Chowdhury,  S.M. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
09 May 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Chowdhury, S.M. and Jeon, J.Y. and Saha, B. (2017) 'Gender diﬀerences in the giving and taking variants of
the Dictator game.', Southern economic journal., 84 (2). pp. 474-483.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12223
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article: Chowdhury, S.M., Jeon, J.Y. Saha, B. (2017). Gender Diﬀerences
in the Giving and Taking Variants of the Dictator Game. Southern Economic Journal 84(2): 474-483, which has been
published in ﬁnal form at https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12223. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in
accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Gender Differences in the Giving and Taking 
Variants of the Dictator Game* 
 
 
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 
a
 Joo Young Jeon, 
a
 and Bibhas Saha 
b
 
a
 School of Economics, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and 
Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK, 
S.Modak-Chowdhury@uea.ac.uk,  J.Jeon@uea.ac.uk  
 
b
 Durham University Business School, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3LB, UK,  
b.c.saha@durham.ac.uk  
 
 
 
Abstract  
We run between-subject dictator games with exogenously specified ‘give’ or ‘take’ 
frames involving a balanced pool of male and female dictators and constant payoff 
possibilities. We find the following: Females allocate more under the taking frame than 
under the giving frame. Males allocate more under the giving frame than under the taking 
frame. In the taking frame females are more generous than males. But in the giving frame 
both are equally generous. Finally, when the combined population of males and females 
is considered, giving is found to be equivalent to ‘not taking’, because the opposing 
gender effects offset each other.  
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1. Introduction 
The ‘Dictator game’ has been one of the most popular experimental workhorses to 
understand and estimate altruism. In the standard form (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe 
et al., 1994) of the game, a subject (called the dictator) is given a certain amount of 
money and is asked to decide upon how much of that money to allocate between 
himself/herself and a passive subject (called the recipient). Since the dictator does not 
otherwise have any incentive to share the money with the recipient, the amount allocated 
is often used as a measure of altruism. Indeed, several experiments consistently find that 
dictators, on average, allocate a non-trivial sum of money (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011).  
There are variations of frames in the dictator game. A ‘taking’ frame (in short, TG) 
different to the ‘giving’ frame (as explained above and in short GG) is often employed, 
where the recipient is given an endowment and the dictator decides how much to ‘take’ 
from the recipient’s endowment. The aim of this framing is to investigate greed and to 
test whether ‘not taking’ is equivalent to ‘giving’. Suvoy (2003), who was the first to 
introduce the ‘taking’ frame in the social preference literature, 1  did not find any 
significant difference in the allocations between the two frames, a conclusion both shared 
and contested in subsequent studies, which we discuss later.  
The literature, however, has not investigated whether the implementation of the 
giving and taking frames would give rise to any gender effects. The current study is 
aimed at this particular question. We run a between-subject dictator game with two 
alternative framing, ‘give’ (GG) and ‘take’ (TG), involving a balanced pool of male and 
female dictators while holding the total amount to be divided constant.  
We expect the gender issue to be potentially important for the following reasons. 
Various studies in economics and psychology alike suggest that a change in framing may 
cause diverse and gender specific cognitive biases, and in turn different behaviors 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). These include endowment effects (Thaler, 1980) or status-
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).  It has also been evidenced that males and 
females differ in their perception of the entitlement effects and property rights (Bylsma 
and Major, 1992), or endowment effects (Dommer and Swaminathan, 2013). In standard 
                                                          
1
 Eichenberger and Oberholzer–Gee (1998) and Falk and Fischbacher (2002) have earlier introduced this 
game in the context of crime. 
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dictator giving games Eckel and Grossman (1998) found different behaviors between 
male and female dictators.   
Based on the above evidence, it is reasonable to expect that the introduction of 
two alternative framings, as we have done in this paper, would permit us to study 
asymmetric gender effects, if any. Specifically, the giving frame introduces a salience of 
the dictator’s property right (over the fund), while the taking frame does the same for the 
recipient’s property right. Since males and females tend to have different perceptions of 
property right, we should see asymmetric behaviors across the two genders under two 
different framings.  
Indeed, our results support this hypothesis. We find that: (i) Males are less 
generous in taking games than in giving games. (ii) Females are more generous in taking 
games than in giving games. (iii) In taking games, females are more generous than males. 
(iv) In giving games, females’ generosity is not significantly different from the males’ 
generosity. (v) Females are more likely to be egalitarian under taking frames than under 
giving games. (vi) Males are more likely to be selfish under the taking frame than under 
the giving frame. 
We infer that the results obtained are due to males’ (relatively) stronger sense of 
entitlement and property right as shown by Bylsma and Major (1992) and females’ 
(relatively) stronger endowment effect as shown by Dommer and Swaminathan (2013). 
On one hand, the taking frame may trigger differing degrees of entitlement effect 
between males and females, resulting in divergent behaviors. On the other hand, the 
giving frame may trigger an endowment effect. Although the (hypothesized) endowment 
effect is not discernably different between males and females, it is probably weaker than 
the entitlement effect for males and stronger than the entitlement effect for females – as 
discussed in the literature--, so that the two genders end up behaving in opposite ways 
under the two framings.  
Our study contributes to two related streams of literature. First, it contributes to 
the literature on the effects of gender in the dictator game. Second, it also relates to the 
literature investigating the effects of framing in dictator games. Below we specify our 
contribution in both the streams.  
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Bolton and Katok (1995) are the first to test the effect of dictator gender on 
dictator giving in the GG and find no such effect. Eckel and Grossman (1998), however, 
find that women are more generous than men in a GG when the recipient is a charity. 
Further studies such as Selten and Ockenfels (1998), Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002), 
Cadsby et al. (2010) produce mixed results. No study has investigated the same for a pure 
Taking Game. There are studies that allow cues and study the effects of being observed, 
or anonymity. For instance, Alevy et al. (2014) consider the effects when the dictator 
decisions are being observed and find that males take less and females remain unaffected 
in allocation decisions while being observed. In a study along the same lines, Chowdhury 
et al. (2014) find males take less and females take more in presence of social cues in a 
TG. Kettner and Ceccato (2014) investigate the effects of framing while interacting with 
revelation of dictator and recipient gender. They find that dictators take significantly less 
when the recipient is of the opposite gender. Our study does not consider issues like cues 
and anonymity, and thereby we are able to show that independent of cues and identities, 
the interaction of framing and gender alone can have significant effects. 
 Our study also sheds light on the question of equivalence between ‘giving’ and 
‘not taking’ by comparing the recipient’s payoff under two alternative framings. Since 
Suvoy’s (2003) claim of equivalence between giving and ‘not taking’, the issue has been 
investigated time and again -- by changing the type of the recipient, by using laboratory 
or online experiment, and by varying the decision space (i.e., by giving the dictator an 
option to ‘give’ or ‘take’). Among these studies, Dreber et al. (2013) Kettner and Ceccato 
(2014) and Grossman and Eckel (2015) find equivalence between giving and not taking.
2
 
We support and extend their results. We also show that although the overall equivalence 
prevails in terms of overall payoff, the framing effect is opposite when we consider 
dictator’s gender. 
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 In our design and in the design of the studies mentioned the decision space is fixed, i.e., the dictators play 
either a GG or a TG, and do not have the option to give and take simultaneously. Furthermore, in our 
experiment the price of giving or taking is fixed. Combining these two features, the total payoff in these 
two games (GG and TG) remains the same. However, there are studies following List (2007) and Bardsley 
(2008) in which the decision space has been set different among frames, or the price of action is different – 
and as a result the total payoff is also different. In such cases Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), Cappelen et al. 
(2013), Korenok et al. (2013, 2014, 2015), and Cox et al. (2016) find that the payoff to the recipient may be 
different with a change in framing.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, 
Section 3 reports the results, and Section 4 concludes with further discussions. 
 
 
2. Experimental Design 
We employed a between-subject Dictator game with 280 subjects spread over 2 
treatments. Each treatment had 70 dictators and 70 recipients. To ensure gender balance, 
in each treatment we recruited 35 male and 35 female dictators. Only one treatment was 
run in a particular session. In each session, subjects were randomly and anonymously 
placed into pairs and were asked to sit in cubicles. They were then assigned the role as 
either a dictator or a recipient (however, we did not use those terms). Each subject played 
only one role and the roles remained the same until the end of the session.  
All subjects were told that they would receive a £3 show-up fee. In the ‘giving’ 
treatment the dictator was given access to an additional £10 fund and could transfer any 
amount between £0 and £10 (in denominations of 1 penny) to the recipient. In the ‘taking’ 
treatment the recipient was given access to an additional £10 and the dictator could 
transfer any amount between £0 and £10 (in denominations of 1 penny) to himself/herself. 
We executed neutral word such as ‘transfer’ instead of ‘give’ and ‘take’, and ‘access’ 
instead of ‘belong’ to minimize any experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010) arising 
from the instruction (which are available in the Appendix). The role of the recipients was 
passive, meaning that they had to accept the dictators’ decision.  
Each session consisted of two parts. In the first part, the dictators made decisions. 
In the second part, the recipients had to guess the amount the dictator had given or taken. 
If the absolute difference between the actual amount and the guess was within 50 pence, 
then the recipient received an extra £1.
3
 As we did not find any treatment or gender effect 
in the guesses, this element is not discussed further. 
                                                          
3
 This incentive mechanism for guess is similar to the one by Chowdhury and Jeon (2013). The instructions 
for the second part was given only after the first part was finished. It was also mentioned in the instruction 
of the first part that the recipient’s decision was payoff irrelevant to the dictator, restricting any strategic 
interaction between dictator decision and recipient anticipation. 
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Subjects were students at the University of East Anglia, with no prior experience 
of participating in a GG or a TG experiment, recruited randomly through the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The sessions were computerized with z-
TREE (Fischbacher, 2007). A subject could participate in only one session. Each session 
took around 30 minutes and the average payment was £8.  
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the average amount allocated (amount given in the GG, or (£10 – 
amount taken) in the TG) for both aggregated data and also for male and female by 
treatment. In the GG, an average of £2.066 is given to the recipients. In the TG, the 
dictators take on average £7.87 and as a result, the amount left to the recipient is £2.13. A 
Mann-Whitney test shows no significant difference in final amount allocated to recipients 
between the two treatments (p-value = 0.583). This result is consistent with the 
established result (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2015) that there is no effect 
of framing in dictator allocation. We now investigate these actions across gender. Male 
dictators on average allocate £2.117 in the GG and £0.997 in the TG towards the 
recipients, and a Mann-Whitney test shows significant difference at 1% level. However, 
the average allocation by female dictators is £2.014 in the GG and £3.263 in the TG, and 
the difference is significant at 5% level. The results also confirm within treatment gender 
differences. In the GG, the amount given by male and female are not different (p-value = 
0.594). The TG, however, shows gender differences. The average amount left by the male 
dictators is significantly lower than the amount left by the female dictators at 1% level. 
 
Table 1. Average (Standard Dev) allocation to recipient  
Data Giving game Taking game 
Mann-Whitney test 
(Giving vs. Taking) 
All 
(70 obs. / treatment)  
2.066 
(1.734) 
2.130 
(2.394) 
No difference 
(p=0.583) 
Male 
(35 obs. / treatment)  
2.117 
(1.530) 
0.997 
(1.589) 
Different at 1% 
 (p = 0.001) 
Female 
(35 obs. / treatment) 
2.014 
(1.938) 
3.263 
(2.543) 
Different at 5% 
( p = 0.039) 
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Mann-Whitney test 
(Male vs. Female) 
No difference 
(p=0.594) 
Different at 1% 
(p= 0.0001) 
–– 
 
To control for interactions and to test robustness of the results above we further 
run a series of OLS regressions as reported in Table 2. The dependent variable is the 
amount allocated to the recipient and the independent variables are treatment dummy, 
gender dummy, their interactions and an age dummy (Age21=1 if age ≤ 21).
4
 We run the 
analysis for the whole data as well as separately for males and females. 
Table 2. Regression of amount allocated to the recipient 
OLS Total Total Male Female 
Intercept 0.720 0.242 0.164 2.588
**
 
 
(0.738) (0.721) (0.765) (1.150) 
Giving game -0.004  1.159
***
 -1.186
**
 
 
(0.345)  (0.373) (0.552) 
Female 1.097
***
  
 
 
 
(0.342)  
 
 
TG × Female  2.262
***
 
 
 
 
 (0.464) 
 
 
GG × Male  1.155
**
 
 
 
 
 (0.465) 
 
 
GG × Female  1.084
**
 
 
 
 
 (0.467) 
 
 
Age21 0.037 0.033 0.036 0.029 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.047) 
# of Obs. 140 140 70 70 
Adjusted R
2
 0.059 0.133 0.109 0.051 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***
,
**
  and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
In the first column of Table 2 we use a dummy for the GG to test for the framing 
effect while controlling for gender and age. Complying with the result in Table 1, the 
coefficient for GG is insignificant, but the coefficient of Female is positive and 
significant at 1% level. The first observation implies no overall treatment effect and 
                                                          
4
 We include age as a control variable for two reasons. First, Engel (2011) shows in his meta-analysis that 
the effect of age is significant in dictator games. Second, a line of research (Grusec, 1972; Bahry and 
Wilson, 2006; Sutter and Kocher, 2007) shows effects of age in various social preference experiments. 
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mirrors the findings of Dreber et al. (2013, Table 1), who report a similar result from 
their lab experiment. The second observation shows that female dictators are more 
generous than males.  
These observations, still, do not reveal any effect of framing on gender. The 
existing literature also does not focus on this issue. Therefore, in order to examine the 
gender effect further, in Colum 2 of Table 2 we introduce interactions of gender and 
treatment. The coefficient for the interaction of TG and Female and the corresponding 
post-regression tests show that females allocate significantly higher amounts in the TG 
frame compared to their male counterparts. Then we run the same regression, without the 
interaction terms, for males and females separately and discover a gender-wise treatment 
effect. In particular, males allocate more amount in the GG compared to the TG (at 1% 
level), but females do exactly the opposite (at 5% level). 
Until now we have analyzed the average amount allocated, and found asymmetric 
effects of framing on gender. But this analysis does reveal the mechanism through which 
this asymmetry arises. Understanding the mechanism, however, is important since it is 
related to the distribution of the ‘social type’ of the dictators. A social type in a dictator 
game is a broad categorization of the subjects given their allocation behavior (see, e.g., 
Fehr et al., 2008). This categorization will help us to understand whether a specific type 
of allocation behavior is observed across treatments or across gender. We define a 
dictator to be ‘selfish’ if he/she does not allocate any money to the recipient, ‘egalitarian’ 
if he/she divides the pie equally, and ‘in-between’ if he/she allocates an amount between 
zero and half-of-the-pie to the recipient. 
 To visualize the allocation distribution in these two frames, we plot the 
proportion of dictators by the amount allocated to the recipients (in approximated blocks) 
in Figure 1. Note that the allocation in both frames exhibits a bimodal distribution of the 
social types; but the second mode as well as the frequency distribution at the modes vary 
between the two frames. In the TG, two modes appear at the ‘selfish’ and ‘egalitarian’ 
types, while in the GG, they appear at the ‘selfish’ and ‘in-between’ types.  The 
difference in the distribution suggests that the two frames invoke different social types. 
Moreover, the TG increases the frequency of both extreme types, selfish as well as 
egalitarian, by about 10 percentage points over the GG.   
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Figure 1. Allocation in GG and TG. 
 
We plot the allocation distribution in these two frames by gender in Figure 2. The 
allocation distribution for the GG does not show a specific pattern for either gender; if 
anything it shows a weak form of bimodal distribution. But for the TG the distribution 
drastically changes to a right-skewed one for males and a left-skewed one for females. 
Under the taking frame 60% of the males turn ‘selfish’ and 40% of the females turn 
‘egalitarian’.  Most striking is the way the proportion of the selfish type changed for each 
gender with the change in framing. With the taking frame, the proportion of the selfish 
males massively increased from 22% to 60%; but the proportion of the selfish females 
dropped from 38% to 22%.  Clearly, the taking frame is invoking a strong sense of 
selfishness amongst males, but a fairly strong sense of generosity amongst females.  
To test the significance of these observations, we run two sets of Probit 
regressions. The dependent variable in the first set is a dummy for whether a subject is 
selfish, and in the second set a dummy for whether a subject is egalitarian, with the 
independent variables being the treatment dummy and age.
5
 We first run the regressions 
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 A male subject, who gave £0.09 in the GG, is categorized as a selfish and a Female subject, who took 
£4.90 in the TG, is categorized as an egalitarian. Two female subjects, who took £2.10 and £0.00 in the TG, 
are not included in any categories.   
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for the whole data, and then separately for males and females. We discuss only the 
gender-specific regressions by reporting the marginal effects in Table 3. 
 
Figure 2. Allocation in GG and TG by gender 
 
 
Table 3. Probit Regressions investigating dictators’ social type  
 Male Female 
 
Y=Selfish Y=Egalitarian Y=Selfish Y=Egalitarian 
Giving game -0.389
***
 0.006 0.075 -0.190
**
 
 
(0.110) (0.067) (0.107) (0.109) 
Age21 -0.012 0.003 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.013)  (0.009) 
# of Obs.        70              70 70               70 
Pseudo R
2
 0.118           0.009  0.011           0.043 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
***
,
**
  and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
The Probit models confirm that broad observations of Figure 2 are indeed correct; 
there exists a framing effect across gender for the social type distribution.
 
The first two 
regressions show that males tend to be more selfish in the TG compared to the GG, but 
the frame does not affect their likelihood of being egalitarian. In contrast, the last two 
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regressions show that females tend to be more egalitarian in the TG compared to the GG, 
but the frame does not affect their likelihood of being selfish.
6
  
4. Discussion 
We investigate the effects of gender on the framing of dictator game when the total 
payoff remains the same across treatments. We employ a giving and a taking frame and 
compare the amount given in the giving frame with the amount left for the recipient in the 
taking frame. We expected a gender effect due to a possible endowment effect or the 
effect of perceived entitlement and hence employed a balanced pool of male and female 
dictators. 
Both non-parametric tests and regressions reaffirm the observations from existing 
studies (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman and Eckel, 2015) that overall there is no framing 
effect within the dictator game and giving is indeed equivalent to ‘not taking’. However, 
further investigations by gender show that framing has opposing effects for females and 
males. Females take less in a taking game compared to what they give in a giving game; 
but the males do just the opposite. Furthermore, we find that this occurs since the male 
dictators are significantly more likely to be selfish in the taking frame compared to the 
giving frame. On the other hand, the female dictators are significantly more likely to be 
egalitarian in the taking frame compared to the giving frame. 
Our result is of interest for a number of reasons. First, it sheds light on a very 
active line of research regarding the gender effect on behavioral decision making. Since 
the frame induces social-type variations in the dictator, in opposite directions, for the two 
genders, the question of the effect of framing in general on gender-specific behavior 
remains a promising line of research. Such studies will also be helpful to understand why 
the males and females behaved differently in our study of the dictator game. 
Second, we contribute to the debate on the equivalence between ‘giving’ and ‘not 
taking’. One existing line of research finds such equivalence when the total payoff is 
constant, whereas other studies find the opposite result when the total payoff is different.  
                                                          
6
 The frames do not show a significant effect in the whole data (and hence we do not report the regressions), 
further supporting the overall results of the existing studies. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, corresponding to 
the data of Figure 1 and Figure 2, show no framing effect in allocation for the whole data (p-value = 0.288); 
but significant effects separately for males and for females (p-values of 0.001 and 0.039, respectively). 
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We add to this debate showing that as long as we consider the whole population we may 
see equivalence. But when we turn our attention to gender-specific subgroups we see 
non-equivalence. This contrasting mix is a novel observation in this literature.   
Finally, as a consequence of our results, one can alternatively use a giving or a 
taking frame in various research questions without changing the decision space – so long 
as the investigation is not focused on gender; or the issue of taking/giving price, or the 
choice of the game (Korenok et al., 2014; 2015) are absent.  
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Appendix: Instructions 
 
The subjects were undergraduate students of the University of East Anglia. Those 
respondents to the call, who had earlier participated in similar games, were screened 
out to ensure that no subjects were influenced by prior experience of dictator games. 
 
1. Instruction for Dictator in Taking game  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment! In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person. 
You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will 
not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. 
The experiment has two parts and is conducted as follows: 
 Everyone in this room has already been allocated a show up fee of £3. You have been 
paired with someone else in the room. 
 The other person you are paired with has access to an additional £10. 
 In the first part of the experiment, you will have to make a simple decision. You have to 
decide what portion, if any, of the £10 to transfer to yourself. Your choice can be 
anywhere from £0 to £10, in 1p increments. Your take-home earnings from this 
experiment will be your initial £3 show up fee plus the money you transfer from the 
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person you are paired with. The earnings of the person you are paired with will be his/her 
£3 show up fee plus the money left over from the £10 after you transfer to yourself. 
 In the second part of the experiment, the person you are paired with will make a decision, 
but that decision will NOT affect your earnings. 
You will have 1 minute to come to a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to the other 
people in this room until your session is completed. Do not be concerned if other people make 
their decisions before you.  
 
2. Instruction for Dictator in Giving game  
 
 
 
 
 
Welcome to this experiment! In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person. 
You will not be told who you are matched with during or after the experiment, and he or she will 
not be told who you are either during or after the experiment. 
Your decisions will be strictly anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. 
The experiment has two parts and is conducted as follows: 
 Everyone in this room has already been allocated a show up fee of £3. You have been 
paired with someone else in the room. 
 You have access to an additional £10. The other person you are paired with does not have 
access to that extra £10. 
 In the first part of the experiment, you will have to make a simple decision. You have to 
decide what portion, if any, of the £10 to transfer to the person you are paired with. Your 
choice can be anywhere from £0 to £10, in 1p increments. Your take-home earnings from 
this experiment will be your initial £3 show up fee plus the money left over from the £10 
after you transfer to the person you are paired with. The earnings of the person you are 
paired with will be the amount you transfer to him/her plus his/her £3 show up fee. 
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 In the second part of the experiment, the person you are paired with will make a decision, 
but that decision will NOT affect your earnings. 
You will have 1 minute to come to a decision about your choice. Please do not talk to the other 
people in this room until your session is completed. Do not be concerned if other people make 
their decisions before you.  
 
